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Perkins: Better Late than Never: The John Anderson Cases and the Constitut

NOTES

BETTER LATE THAN NEVER: THE JOHN
ANDERSON CASES AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FILING DEADLINES
Perhaps the greatest strength underlying our nation's constitutional form of democracy has been the ability of citizens to exercise
their voting rights freely.1 Yet, even though the constitution generally prohibits laws which directly interfere with or usurp the right to
vote,2 this right may be effectively limited by other laws in a more
indirect fashion. For example, if a voter's electoral choice is limited
to only two candidates because election laws have denied ballot access to other legitimate non-frivolous candidates, the voter's ability
and right to express his political preference may be severely undermined. 3 Typically, the Democrats and the Republicans always gain a
ballot position in major elections and comprise the overwhelming
1. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964): "No right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as
good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined."
2. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969) (invalidating on the basis of the equal protection clause a New York statute excluding certain
school district residents, otherwise eligible to vote in a school district election, because they
neither "(1) own (or lease) taxable real property within the district [n]or (2) are parents (or
have custody of) children enrolled in the local public schools."); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (invalidating on equal protection grounds a Virginia poll
tax conditioning the right to vote on the payment of a fee or tax); Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89, 89 n.l (1965) (invalidating on equal protection grounds a Texas constitutional provision permitting a member of the armed forces throughout the course of his or her military
duty to "vote only in the county in which he or she resided at time of entry into service").
3. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184
(1979); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31
(1968). These cases illustrate the Supreme Court invalidating, on first amendment and fourteenth amendment grounds, various election laws that effectively precluded the plaintiff-candidates from gaining ballot access and thereby undercut their supporters' rights to vote for them
as an expression of their political preference.
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majority of successfully elected candidates.4 However, insofar as restrictive state laws may bar ballot access to legitimate third party or
independent candidates, 5 statutory mechanisms have been created
that not only tend to favor a two party system, but that may insure
and perpetuate a "complete monopoly" by these two particular parties.' The process by which state election laws tend to "freeze the

political status quo ' 7 conflicts with one of the most basic constitutional principles underlying the first amendment, which implies that
the electoral process should be a "marketplace" for the free competition of ideas."
Since the landmark case of Williams v. Rhodes,9 it has been
generally considered beyond dispute that ballot access restrictions
burden "two distinct and fundamental" first amendment rights; 10
namely, "the right of individuals to associate for advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their
political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively." 11 Furthermore,
where state law requires candidates to comply with varying ballot
4. See C. ROSSITER, PARTIES AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 3 (1960); N.Y. Times, Nov. 4,
1982, at A20, col. 1.
5. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F.
Supp. 121 (S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.
2035 (1982); MacBride v. Exon, 558 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1977) (invalidating on first amendment and fourteenth amendment grounds a statute requiring third parties to comply with filing
deadlines ninety days prior to the state primary election and nine months prior to the general
election).
6. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
At least one Founding Father expressed dismay over the possibility that a two-party system would emerge: "There is nothing which I dread so much as a division of the republic into
two great parties, each arranged under its leader, and concerting measures in opposition to
each other. This, in my humble apprehension, is to be dreaded as the greatest political evil
under our Constitution." 9 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 511 (1854) (letter from John Adams to
Jonathan Jackson, Oct. 2, 1780), quoted in McCarthy, Unconstitutional Support of the Two
Party System, 21 Loy. L. REV. 663, 663 (1975).
7. Arutunoff v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 687 F.2d 1375, 1378 (10th Cir. 1982).
8. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 32. See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment.
9. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
10. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979).
11. Williams, 393 U.S. at 30.
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access requirements depending on their party affiliations,12 the equal
14
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment" is also at issue.
Although there is significant and recent Supreme Court precedent
concerning constitutional challenges to ballot access restrictions, 15
the standard of review suggested by these cases is far from clear."
This note analyzes the conflicting strains within the Supreme
Court's constitutional analysis and proposes a new standard of review for ballot access cases based on a synthesis of implicit and explicit "tests" employed by the Court. This note also examines how,
why, and when a particular type of state ballot access requirement-the filing deadline for a candidate's nominating petition -- may violate the constitutional rights of candidates and voters
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. This inquiry into
the constitutional validity of filing deadline statutes serves as a vehicle to apply the proposed analytical framework to a specific context

within the larger sphere of ballot access law.
Filing deadline statutes have been litigated in various lower
court cases involving both national and state elections.' 8 Most re12. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 7.1 (Supp. 1982). Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
3513.05 (Page Supp. 1981) (nominating requirements for partisan candidates) with OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.257 (Page Supp. 1981) (nominating requirements for independent
candidates).
13. "No State shall . . . deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 128 (S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd,
664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982); Anderson v. Quinn, 495
F. Supp. 730, 731 (D. Me. 1980), affd. mem., 634 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1980).
15. See, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173
(1979); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974). For a discussion of recent Supreme Court
cases, see infra text accompanying notes 78-143.
16. See infra notes 78-143 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 494 (Supp. 1982-1983); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3513.257 (Page Supp. 1981). State statutes often may impose other requirements such
as filing fees, see, e.g., MD. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 4A-6 (Supp. 1982); a specified period of time
in which signatures may be collected, see, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2913 (Purdon 1963 &
Supp. 1982); Disaffiliation provisions, see, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6830 (West 1977 & Supp.
1982); or sore loser provisions, see, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.345 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1982).
18. These cases focused on state filing deadline statutes either alone or in conjunction
with other ballot access statutes. See McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980); Skeen
v. Hooper, 631 F.2d 707 (10th Cir. 1980); Greaves v. State Bd. of Elections, 508 F. Supp. 78
(E.D.N.C. 1980); Whig Party v. Siegelman, 500 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Ala. 1980); Rock v.
Bryant, 459 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Ark. 1978); Bradley v. Mandel, 449 F. Supp. 983 (D. Md.
1978); Lendall v. Jernigan, 424 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Ark. 1977); Ashworth v. Fortson 424 F.
Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Toporek v. South Carolina State Bd. Election Comm'n, 362 F.
Supp. 613 (D.S.C. 1973). For cases of this nature which involved presidential candidates,
other than John Anderson, see MacBride v. Exon, 558 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1977); Commoner v.

§
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cently, they were challenged on constitutional grounds in several
cases arising out of John B. Anderson's 1980 presidential campaign. 19 Anderson,20 who was originally a candidate in several states'
Republican presidential primaries, 21 declared his independent candidacy on April 24, 198022 and sought access to the November ballot
via the states' petition procedures.2 3 At that time, however, Anderson
was denied access to the ballot as an independent in six states24 because the petition filing deadlines for such candidates had already
passed.2 5 As a result, Anderson brought declaratory and injunctive
DuPont, 501 F. Supp. 778 (D. Del. 1980); LaRouche v. Guzzi, 417 F. Supp. 444 (D. Mass.
1976). For cases involving Eugene McCarthy, see infra note 19.
19. See Anderson v. Morris, 500 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Md.), affd, 636 F.2d 55 (4th Cir.
1980); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 554 (6th
Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982); Anderson v. Hooper, 498 F. Supp. 898
(D.N.M. 1980); Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730 (D. Me.), afd mem., 634 F.2d 616
(Ist Cir. 1980). The other two cases were decided on state law grounds. See Anderson v. Babb,
632 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1980); Greaves v. Mills, 497 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Ky. 1980), affd in
part, rev'd In part, sub nom. Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1981). The Anderson
cases were not the first time in which state filing deadlines statutes were challenged by a
candidate in a Presidential election. In the 1976 Presidential election, Eugene McCarthy filed
several suits seeking injunctive and declaratory relief similar to that requested by Anderson.
See McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S. 1317 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1976); McCarthy v. Exon,
424 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Neb. 1976); McCarthy v. Austin, 423 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Mich.
1976); McCarthy v. Tribbit, 421 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Del. 1976); McCarthy v. Noel, 420 F.
Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1976); McCarthy v. Askew, 420 F. Supp. 775 (S.D. Fla. 1976), affid, 540
F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1976); McCarthy v. Kirkpatrick, 420 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Mo. 1976). In
two of the cases, the constitutionality of filing deadline statutes was the only substantive controversy. In both of those cases, McCarthy's name was placed on the ballot and filing deadlines
as late as April 27 and August 12 were held unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. See
McCarthy v. Noel, 420 F. Supp. 799, 804-05 (D.R.I. 1976); McCarthy v. Kirkpatrick, 420 F.
Supp. 366, 375 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
20. For an analysis of John Anderson's 1980 presidential campaign, see E. DREW, PORTRAIT OF AN ELECTION: 1980 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 147-57, 277-85 (1981); J. GERMOND
& J. WITCOVER, BLUE SMOKE & MIRRORS 228-42 (1981).
21. "Prior to April 24, 1980, plaintiff Anderson's name appeared or was scheduled to
appear on the ballots of 27 of the 36 states holding Republican primary elections. Nine of
these primaries were held prior to April 24. Plaintiff [Anderson] did not win any of these nine
primaries." Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. at 143.
22. N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1980, at Al, col. 1.
23. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. at 140.
24. Anderson was denied ballot access in Maryland, New Mexico, Maine, Kentucky,
Ohio, and North Carolina. See cases cited supra note 19.
25. See Anderson v. Babb, 632 F.2d 300, 304 (4th Cir. 1980); Anderson v. Morris, 500
F. Supp. 1095, 1096-97 (D. Md. 1980), affd, 636 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1980); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 123 (S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982); Anderson v. Hooper, 498 F. Supp. 898, 900 (D.N.M. 1980);
Greaves v. Mills, 497 F. Supp. 283, 285 (E.D. Ky. 1980), affid in part, rev'd in part, sub.
nom,, Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1981); Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730,
731 (D. Me. 1980), affid mem., 634 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1980).
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suits in these states, seeking to have the respective state statutes
ruled unconstitutional and to have his name placed on the November
presidential ballot. He was successful in all six federal district
courts.2" Furthermore, two of the three circuit courts that have addressed the issue of the constitutionality of the challenged statutes,
have affirmed the lower court holdings. Although the actual state
statutes and filing dates involved in the Anderson cases 28 differed
slightly,29 their net effect was the same. An independent presidential
candidate had to declare his campaign officially and comply with all
necessary regulations in these states four to five months earlier than
either the Democratic or Republican candidate.30
Also at issue in these cases were disaffiliation provisions, but the courts found these statutes inapplicable to Anderson and, therefore, not a bar to his candidacy. See Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 118.345 (Bobbs-Merrill 1982), discussed in Greaves v. Mills, 497 F. Supp. 283, 287
(E.D. Ky. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 493 (Supp. 1982-1983), discussed in Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730, 734 n.8 (D. Me. 1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 8-2
(1976), discussed in Anderson v. Morris, 500 F. Supp. 1095, 1097 n.4 (D. Md. 1980); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1-8-19, 1-10-7 (1978) (amended 1981), discussed in Anderson v. Hooper, 498
F. Supp. 898, 903 (D.N.M. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-213.6 (Supp. 1982), discussed in
Anderson v. Babb, 632 F.2d 300, 302-09 (4th Cir. 1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.04
(Page Supp. 1981), discussed in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 135 (S.D. Ohio
1980). See infra note 124 for a description of disaffiliation statutes.
26. See Anderson v. Babb, 632 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1980) (district court's opinion unreported); Anderson v. Morris, 500 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Md. 1980); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499
F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Ohio 1980); Anderson v. Hooper, 498 F. Supp. 898 (D.N.M. 1980);
Greaves v. Mills, 497 F. Supp. 283 (D. Ky. 1980); Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730 (D.
Me. 1980). Anderson eventually appeared on all fifty state presidential ballots, as well as the
District of Columbia, and received approximately 7% of the popular vote. N.Y. Times, May 4,
1982, at B7, col. 1.
27. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the unconstitutionality of Maryland's March 3 filing
deadline for independent presidential candidates as provided by MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 7-I
(1976) amended by MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 7-1 (1982). See Anderson v. Morris, 500 F.
Supp. 1095, 1097 (D. Md.), affd, 636 F.2d 55, 59 (4th Cir. 1980). The First Circuit affirmed,

without opinion, the district court's holding that ME.

REV. STAT. ANN.

tit. 21, § 494 (Supp.

1982-1983) which required an independent presidential candidate to file by April 1, 1980, was

unconstitutional. See Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730, 734 (D. Me.), affd mem., 634
F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1980). The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3513.257 (Page Supp. 1981) which required independent candidates to file no later than
March 20, 1980, in order to appear on the November ballot, was constitutional. See Anderson
v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554, 563 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982).
28. Present and subsequent discussion of the Anderson cases will refer only to the four
cases resolved on constitutional grounds, see supra note 19, because the infringement of first
amendment and fourteenth amendment rights by such statutes is the focus of the present
inquiry.
29. Anderson v. Morris, 500 F. Supp. 1095, 1099 (D. Md. 1980) (March 3 deadline);
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 123 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (March 20 deadline); Anderson v. Hooper, 498 F. Supp. 898, 900 (D.N.M. 1980) (March 4 deadline); Anderson v.
Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730, 731 (D. Me. 1980) (April I deadline).
30. See Anderson v. Morris, 500 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (D. Md. 1980) (challenging the
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The Anderson cases and the ensuing controversy surrounding
the several filing deadline statutes represent the most recent manifestation of how ballot access laws infringe first amendment and fourteenth amendment rights of candidates and their supporters. Elucidating and applying an appropriate standard of constitutional review
to this issue helps clarify the issues still unsettled in the Anderson
cases31 and suggests the proper analytical methodology applicable in
future ballot access cases. This note is divided into three main sections: Part I analyzes the first amendment interests implicated by
this controversy; 2 part II examines the standard of review under the
fourteenth amendment suggested by the Supreme Court in their
constitutionality of MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 4A-1 (1976)); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F.
Supp. 121, 128-29 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (challenging the constitutionality of OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3513.257 (Page Supp. 1981)); Anderson v. Hooper, 498 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D.N.M.
1980) (challenging the constitutionality of N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-26 (1978)); Anderson v.
Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730, 732 (D. Me. 1980) (challenging the constitutionality of ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 494 (Supp. 1982-1983)).
31. The unsettled issues in the Anderson cases are exemplified by the disagreement between the circuit courts. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
32. It has been argued by the state of Ohio, in defense of its challenged filing deadline
statute (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3513.257), that the Supreme Court's summary affirmances in
Sweetenham v. Rhodes, 318 F. Supp. 1262 (S.D. Ohio 1970), af'd mem. sub nom.
Sweetenham v. Gilligan, 404 U.S. 942 (1972) and Pratt v. Begley, 352 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Ky.
1970), a f/d mem., 409 U.S. 943 (1972), are controlling precedent on the issue of the statute's
constitutional validity and thereby preclude the need for any substantive examination of first
amendment and fourteenth amendment rights potentially violated by the statute. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 135-36 n.9 (S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 554, 557-60
(6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982). The district court in Anderson v. Celebrezze rejected this argument after citing to Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977),
remanded, 449 F. Supp. 983 (D. Md. 1978), for the proposition that a "summary affirmance
affirms the judgment only and not the reasoning of the lower court [and] its precedential value
is limited to the precise questions presented and necessarily decided by it." Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. at 136 n.9 (citation omitted). Mandel considered the constitutionality of
a Maryland filing statute with respect to its deadline date and quantitative signature requirements. 432 U.S. at 174. Mandel vacated and remanded the district court's judgment because
of the lower court's misplaced reliance on the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in a previous filing deadline case, Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affd mem., 424
U.S. 959 (1976). Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176-77. Thus, the district court in Anderson v. Celebrezze dismissed the state's argument because of the narrow fact sensitive application of the
Supreme Court's summary decisions mandated by Mandel. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F.
Supp. at 135 n.9.
Despite Mandel's caution to lower courts not to treat their summary decisions with great
precedential significance, the Sixth Circuit in Anderson v. Celebrezze, concluded, in dicta, that
Sweetenhan and Pratt disposed of Anderson's first amendment challenge to Ohio's filing deadline. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d at 560. However, since this was a "slender reed," id., to
rest their decision upon, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment on other
grounds. See id. at 567. Thus, in light of Mandel and the indecisive weight the Sixth Circuit
accorded this issue, further examination of this argument is unwarranted.
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leading ballot access decisions; part III applies the proposed analytical framework to the central issues in the Anderson cases.
I.

FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Most states have similar legal processes by which third party or
independent candidates gain ballot access. Typically, states require a
candidate to file, by a particular date preceding the general election,
a petition of candidacy with a specific number or percentage of qualified voters' signatures. 3 Despite the basic similarities in state filing
statutes, there are wide variations in the quantitative and temporal
requirements imposed upon the individuals seeking to gain ballot access through the petition process. 3 This lack of uniformity among
the states' petition requirements raises the following question: When
is a filing deadline for a nominating petition impermissibly early?
Although the controversy may be reduced to a "slippery slope" argument of when to draw the line, the inquiry is complicated by consideration of the constitutional and practical impact of the filing deadline statutes upon excluded candidates and their supporters. 5 For
example, assume that state law requires an independent or third
party candidate to file his nominating petition by April 1, yet allows
a major party candidate to file his declaration of candidacy for the
November ballot sometime in September, following his party's primary.3 6 The pertinent judicial inquiry must focus not only on
whether April 1 is an unduly early deadline, but also on whether the
deadline infringes the rights of the excluded candidate's supporters
by denying access to their candidate, 37 and whether different types of
candidates deserve different temporal deadlines. 8
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that ballot access restrictions burden two fundamental rights: the right of association and the
right to vote.3 9 The fundamental nature of these rights plays a critical role in the judicial analysis of ballot access cases and in the de33. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 494 (Supp. 1982-1983); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 33, § 7-1 (1976) (amended 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.257 (Page Supp. 1981).
34. See generally Note, Nominating Petition Requirementsfor Third Party and Independent Candidate Ballot Access, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 974, 1013-24 (1977) (appendix listing petition requirements for each state).

35. See infra notes 39-55, 206-21 and accompanying text.
36. See Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730, 731 (D. Me. 1980), affld mem., 634 F.2d
616 (1st Cir. 1980).

37. See infra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
38.

See infra notes 222-41 and accompanying text.

39. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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termination of a standard of scrutiny that the courts will apply.40
This is especially true since the right of candidacy has never been
recognized by a majority of the Supreme Court as a "fundamental
right" 41 and thus, by itself, is insufficient to invoke "strict" constitutional scrutiny of ballot access restrictions.42
The Supreme Court in Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party43 has aptly described how ballot access restrictions can burden fundamental rights:
The freedom to associate as a political party, a right we have recognized as fundamental, has diminished practical value if the party
can be kept off the ballot. Access restrictions also implicate the
right to vote because, absent recourse to referendums, "voters can
assert their preferences only through candidates or parties or
both." By limiting the choices available to voters, the State impairs
the voters' ability to express their political preferences. And for
reasons too self-evident to warrant amplification here, we have
often reiterated that voting is of the most fundamental significance
under our constitutional structure."
If an unreasonably early filing deadline prevents an otherwise
legitimate candidate from appearing on the ballot, then the candidate's and his supporters' freedom to associate as a political party or
entity is seriously burdened. 45 Although it is true that independent or
third party candidates could still express their political viewpoints
and their supporters could associate together in some general fashion, the denial of ballot access "diminish[es] the effectiveness of
their exercise of the[se] right[s] ."'4 To the extent that these rights of
40. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
41. See Clements v. Fashing, 102 S. Ct. 2836, 2843 (1982). For the view that the right
of candidacy should be considered a fundamental right, see Lippitt v. Cipollone, 404 U.S.
1032, 1033 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 196 (1st Cir.
1973); Ahrens & Hauserman, Fundamental Election Rights: Association, Voting and Candidacy, 14 VAL. U.L. REv. 465, 465 (1980).
42. Strict scrutiny is only applicable in cases involving fundamental rights or suspect
classifications. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. For an extensive discussion of the
constitutional standards of review applicable in ballot access cases, see infra notes 78-143 and
accompanying text.
43. 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
44. Id. at 184 (citations omitted).
45. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 125 (S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 664
F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 2035 (1982); cf. Illinois State Bd. of
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979) (discussing quantitatively burdensome signature requirements).
46. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 125 (S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d
554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 2035 (1982). See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
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expression and association are burdened, fundamental rights protected by the first amendment are affected.4"
Similarly, if an independent candidate is precluded from ballot
access solely because of a filing deadline, then his supporters' rights
to cast their votes effectively for the candidate of their choice are
also diminished. 48 Thus, in a basic and inescapable way, the fundamental rights of the voters to cast their votes effectively and to associate freely for the advancement of their political beliefs are inextricably intertwined with an individual's right to candidacy and, hence,
ballot access.4 9 This idea has been said to be "axiomatic"50 if the
right to vote is to retain its fundamental significance in our demo-

cratic structure of government. "[U]nless, first, a voter can find a
candidate who expresses the policies the voter desires and second,
that the candidate has equal access to the ballot with all other candidates," ' voting and associational rights become practically impotent
as a peaceful- and effective means of political expression.
The right to vote in presidential elections may also be affected
by filing deadlines in another manner. When the filing deadline initially bars a presidential candidate from a place on the November
23, 31 (1968); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184
(1979). The value of a political campaign was discussed in Illinois Board: "[A]n election
campaign is a means of disseminating ideas as well as attaining political office. Overbroad
restrictions on ballot access jeopardize this form of expression." Id. at 186 (citations omitted).
47. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F.
Supp. 121, 125 (S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.
Ct. 2035 (1982).
48. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968):
The right to form a party for the advancement of political goals means little if a
party can be kept off the election ballot and thus denied an equal opportunity to win
votes. So also, the right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote may be cast only for
one of two parties at a time when other parties are clamoring for a place on the
ballot.
49. See McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159, 1163 (8th Cir. 1980); Green v. McKeon, 468
F.2d 883, 884 (6th Cir. 1972); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 126 (S.D. Ohio
1980), revd, 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982). Sims,
Discriminationin State Election Laws Against Third Party and Independent Candidates,6
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 155, 166 (1974); see also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
[Tihe rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat
separation: laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters. Of course, not every limitation or incidental burden on the
exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of review.
Id. at 143 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). For a further discussion of Bullock, see infra
notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
50. Sims, supra note 49, at 166.
51. Id.
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ballot (as it did in several states in the Anderson cases),5 2 not only
are the voting rights of the excluded candidate's supporters in those
particular states jeopardized, but the effectiveness of the voting
rights of the excluded candidate's supporters nationwide are also endangered. 53 This is due to the fact that the excluded candidate's opportunity to win a majority of electoral votes is necessarily reduced
by the value of the electoral votes in those states in which he is denied ballot access.54 Thus, preclusion from a state ballot arguably
dilutes the effectiveness of the votes cast for that candidate in other
states, to the extent that his chances for overall electoral success are
diminished. 5
It is well settled that the freedom of political association is protected from federal encroachment directly by the first amendment
and from state infringement indirectly by the first amendment
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 56 As a
result, it has been argued that analysis of cases involving freedom of
association would be less "convoluted" if the court centered its analysis on the first amendment itself, without rephrasing the right as a
"fundamental interest" under the rubric of a fourteenth amendment
equal protection standard.5 7 The underlying rationale for the applicability of equal protection analysis is that the statutes involved in
ballot access cases, particularly the filing deadline statutes in the
Anderson cases, tend to involve differential treatment of candidates
based on their party affiliation (or lack thereof). Since equal protection analysis is indeed the approach which the Supreme Court and
lower courts typically adopt when the right of association is implicated in a ballot access case, 58 it is appropriate to examine the four52. See Anderson v. Morris, 500 F. Supp. 1095, 1097 (D. Md. 1980), affid, 636 F.2d 55
(4th Cir. 1980); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 123 (S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 664
F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982); Anderson v. Hooper, 498 F.
Supp. 898, 906 (D.N.M. 1980); Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730, 731 (D. Me. 1980),
afrd mem., 634 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1980).
53. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. at 126.
54. See Id.
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968).
57. Elder, Access to the Ballot by PoliticalCandidates, 83 DICK. L. REV. 387, 403-04
(1979).
58. See, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173
(1979); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968); cf. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp.
121, 128 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (where the court evaluates the equal protection claim despite indicating that first amendment analysis may suffice), rev'd, 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982).
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teenth amendment equal protection clause before discussing further
the substantive issues involved in filing deadline statutes.
II.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

Part of the legacy of the Warren Court was the creation of a
two-tier mode of analysis under the equal protection clause. 59 The
first level of this two-tier approach employs the traditional "rational
relation" test which, when applied by the Court, will uphold a state
statute if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 60
Under this minimum scrutiny test,"' the courts often posit "any conceivable state interest to justify the legislation" 2 and support the
presumption that the state legislature "acted fairly and equitably."6 "

As a result, rarely is a state statute invalidated under this lower level
test which has been criticized as "minimal scrutiny in theory and
4
virtually none in fact."
The upper-tier or strict scrutiny test, requires the state to prove
that the statute furthers a compelling state interest and that there is

no less restrictive means available to achieve the legislative aims. 65
This strict scrutiny analysis has been generally reserved for state
statutes involving either suspect classifications, i.e., race, alienage 6
or fundamental interests, i.e., the right to vote, the right to travel.6 7

Since few statutes survive the application of this strict scrutiny test68
59. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
60. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809-10 (1969)
(failure of Illinois legislature to make voting easier for judicially incapacitated pre-trial detainee who is not absolutely prohibited from exercising franchise, does not offend the
Constitution).
61. See Gunther, supra note 59, at 8.
62. Jardine, Ballot Access Rights: The ConstitutionalStatus of the Right to Run for
Office, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 290, 307.
63. Id.
64. Gunther, supra note 59, at 8.
65. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972).
66. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-13, 16-14 (1978).
67. See id. §§ 16-8, 16-10.
68. See Gunther, supra note 59, at 8. But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (upholding the compelling interest of the United States government to exclude all Japanese Americans, a suspect class, from the West Coast during World War II); American
Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (upholding the state's compelling interest in requiring
certain political parties to nominate candidates through various conventions and to evidence
1% popular support); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (upholding the state's compelling
interest in the stability of its political system as a justification for a challenged disaffiliation
provision). Though Storerand American Partypurported to apply strict scrutiny, they were, in
fact, applying a "much diluted" upper-tier approach. Rada, Cardwell & Friedman, Access to
the Ballot, 13 URn. LAW. 793, 804 (1981). See infra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
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it has been criticized as being strict in "theory and fatal in fact." 69
Thus, the rigid application of either of these tests tends to make the
choice of the proper level of scrutiny outcome determinative as to
whether the statute will be upheld or invalidated.70 To the extent
that this is true, discussion of the proper level of scrutiny "may do
more to obfuscate than to clarify the inquiry,17 1 and, consequently is
of little value in substantive analysis of the issues at hand.72
Due to the inflexibility of the extreme poles of the two-tier approach, alternative intermediary standards of review have been suggested, both by commentators 3 and the Justices themselves. 4 Although these intermediate tests have been applied on occasion in
various equal protection areas, 7 5 the Supreme Court has generally
69. Gunther, supra note 59, at 8. See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting): "[N]o state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing less than perfection."
70. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 189-90
(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
71. Clements v. Fashing, 102 S. Ct. 2836, 2849 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
72. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 189
(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
73. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 59, at 20-24 (suggesting a heightened rational relations test whereby "legislative means must substantially further legislative ends"); Comment,
A New Dimension to Equal Protection and Access to the Ballot: American Party v. White
and Storer v. Brown, 24 AM. U.L. REv. 1293, 1313 n.101 (1975) (arguing that Justice
White's majority opinions in American Party and Storer applied a diluted strict scrutiny analysis somewhat similar to Marshall's balancing approach). For a discussion of alternative
modes of analysis under the equal protection clause in a ballot access context, see Jardine,
supra note 62, at 309-14.
74. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-03 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting):
The task in every case should be to determine the extent to which constitutionally
guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned in the Constitution. As
the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional
interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and
the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly.
Marshall went on to say: "[li]t seems to me inescapably clear that this Court has consistently
adjusted the care with which it will review state discrimination in light of the constitutional
significance of the interests affected and the invidiousness of the particular classification." Id.
at 109 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Clements v. Fashing, 102 S. Ct. 2836, 2849 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (proposing to evaluate whether the state discriminatory classification
offends any federal interest in equality); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164,
173 (1972) (Powell, J.) (proposing to balance the legitimate state interest against the fundamental personal right endangered); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (proposing a multi-factor balancing approach).
75. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972); see authorities cited supra note 74.
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continued to apply the language"6 of its two-tier method of analysis

77
in the ballot access area.
Despite the high Court's reluctance to abandon language indicative of the two-tier mode of analysis, 781 it has, in fact, created a third
level of analysis in its major ballot access decisions.7 Although the
Court has never clearly distinguished'this third standard of review as
separate from its polarized form of analysis,80 the overall reasoning
process of these opinions reveal that the Court is often not rigidly
applying the standard that it enunciates."' This third standard utilized by the Supreme Court in its recent ballot access decisions is an
intermediate standard, which analytically lies somewhere between

76. Although the Court may have invoked the language of the two-tier standard, it may
have done so without really applying either of its tests. See infra notes 78-143 and accompanying text.
77. See Clements v. Fashing, 102 S. Ct. 2836 (1982); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 183-88 (1979).
78. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184-85
(1979).
79. See infra notes 84-143 and accompanying text.
80. See Joseph v. City of Birmingham, 510 F. Supp. 1319, 1333-35 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
The Joseph court discusses and employs what it sees as an intermediate standard of review for
ballot access decisions, emerging from Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974), and Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). Although the Joseph court's critique of the problems plaguing
the two-tier standard in the ballot access area is commendable, by advocating the standard of
Bullock and Lubin-the law must be "found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of
the legitimate state objectives in order to pass constitutional muster," Bullock, 405 U.S. at
144,--the Joseph court only reaches a symptom of the problem and not its cause. By simply
diluting the strict scrutiny standard, Joseph alleviates some of the outcome determinative tendencies of the two-tier standard, but replaces it with an approach which still must apply an
implicit balancing test to adequately weigh the opposing interests. See infra notes 124-30 and
accompanying text.
Cf. Gottlieb, Rebuilding the Right of Association: The Right to Hold A Convention as a
Test Case, I1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 191, 202-03 (1982) (suggesting that the Supreme Court has
applied a subjective balancing test in freedom of association cases concerning delegate selection by political parties and regulation of campaign finances, despite the Court's enunciated
strict scrutiny standard).
81. See infra notes 84-143 and accompanying text. For an argument that the Supreme
Court implemented a five-factor balancing test in Williams, Jenness, Storer and American
Party, see also Note, supra note 34, at 979-83.
The discussion and analysis in this article overlap that of the Notewriter, supra, to the
extent that both suggest that the Court employed an implicit balancing test despite its use of
the traditional two-tier terminology; there is, however, significant analytical divergence. Primarily, the Notewriter argues that the Supreme Court's analysis is reducible to a balance of
five factors rather than an application of the strict scrutiny test, supra, at 982. In so doing, the
Notewriter relegates what is and what should be the central focus of ballot access cases (i.e.,
weighing the state interest supporting the statute against the burden imposed upon the individuals' constitutional interests) to merely one of five factors. This leaves unclear what relevance
this crucial inquiry has had and should have in the Court's overall analysis.
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the strict scrutiny and the rational relation test.82 As this note demonstrates, one of the key features of this third-tier approach is an
increased willingness by the Court to balance the opposing state interests with the individual's constitutional interests, although this
balancing is not a traditional component of either pole of the two83
tier test.
The conceptual confusion engendered by the divergence between
the Court's language and its analytical process has generated the
need to enunciate clearly one uniformly applicable standard. This
standard of review should not ignore past decisions but should instead synthesize their implicit balancing tests into one overarching
standard which can be implemented in all future ballot access cases.
Essentially, the proposed standard should explicitly balance the state
interests that justify the statute against the constitutional interests of
the candidate and his supporters that are infringed by the statute.
Furthermore, this balancing analysis should not merely weigh the
importance of these interests qua interests, but should instead encompass a two-fold inquiry: 1) how efficient is the statute in fulfilling
its underlying interests? and, 2) how great is the burden imposed by
the statute on the constitutional interests of individuals?
Before this proposed standard of review is applied to the Anderson cases, it is helpful to understand its derivation, by examining
how the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis of its ballot access
cases has departed from the traditional two-tier test and how the
Court has utilized an implicit balancing test.
In Williams v. Rhodes, 4 the first of the major, recent ballot
access decisions by the Supreme Court, two political parties8 5 challenged a series of Ohio's election laws8 6 which made it "virtually
impossible" for third party presidential candidates to qualify for the
general ballot.8 7 The plaintiffs claimed that the laws violated the
equal protection clause by denying them access to the ballot and depriving their supporters of the right to vote for their candidates. 8
Justice Black, writing the opinion for the Court, enunciated the ap82. See infra notes 84-143 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
84. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
85. The third parties involved were the Socialist Labor Party and the American Independent Party (organized by George Wallace). Id. at 26.
86. For a description of the burdensome statutes involved and how they interacted, see
Id. at 36 (Douglas, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 25.
88. Id.
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plication of a compelling interest-strict scrutiny analysis and found
that the State of Ohio failed to demonstrate any compelling interest
that would justify the statutory burdens imposed on the rights to
vote and associate. 89 However, the Court also stated: "In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause,
we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the
interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of
those who are disadvantaged by the classification." 90 This implies
that the Court was willing to balance the conflicting interests and
was not simply applying a strict scrutiny test as an outcome determinative confirmation of their a priori decision. 91 Further evidence of a
balancing approach in Williams is the Court's repeated emphasis on
93
92
examining Ohio laws "in their totality" and "taken as a whole."1
Although the Williams Court's focus on the entirety of a statutory
scheme is not mandated by "pure" two-tier analysis,94 this approach
seems uniquely appropriate for ballot access cases, since it facilitates
the relevant inquiry as to whether the state's electoral scheme "as a
whole" tends to "freeze" the political status quo.95
Chief Justice Warren was concerned that Williams left "unresolved what [ballot access] restrictions, if any" a state could constitutionally impose.96 However, three years later in Jenness v. Fortson,97 the Court upheld a ballot access restriction 98 that had been
challenged on essentially the same constitutional grounds as in Williams.9 Although the Jenness Court never announced precisely what
89. Id. at 31.
90. Id. at 30.
91. See Note, supra note 34, at 982. For comments critical of the outcome determinative nature of "pure" strict scrutiny and the two-tier test in general, see supra notes 69-72 and
accompanying text. Probably, it was this type of criticism which stimulated the Supreme
Court to dilute its strict scrutiny in ballot access cases such as Williams and, particularly,
Storer v.Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974). See infra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
92. 393 U.S. at 32.
93. Id. at 34.
94. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
95. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 438-39 (1971); see supra note 7.
96. 393 U.S. at 69 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
97. 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
98. The challenged statute required the plaintiff-candidate to file a nominating petition
signed by "5% of the number of registered voters at the last general election for the office in
question." Id. at 432.
99. Id. at 434. The plaintiffs in Jenness claimed that the statute violated the rights of
freedom of speech and association guaranteed to the candidate and his supporters, and also
that the statute denied the candidate equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment. Id.
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standard of review it was applying, 00 it distinguished Williams" 1
and concluded that, in its totality, the Georgia statutory scheme did

not unfairly perpetuate the major parties' political dominance, "but
implicitly recognize[d] the potential fluidity of American political

life." 10 2 This reiteration of Williams' totality approach may indicate
that Jenness similarly employed an implicit balancing of the opposing constitutional and state interests in upholding the statute. In

light of the Court's finding that the challenged statute did not
abridge any individual's rights of free speech, association, or voting, 03 and was justified by an "important state interest, ' l° the
Court was apparently weighing these opposing considerations without rigidly applying either of the extreme two-tiers of ordinary equal
protection analysis."0
1 08 decided within a year of Jenness, the
In Bullock v. Carter,
Supreme Court once again chose to apply the third-tier balancing
approach which it had begun to develop in Williams and subsequently modified in Jenness. Bullock involved candidates denied ballot access because they could not pay the filing fees required of primary candidates for various public offices.107 The Bullock Court
began its equal protection analysis with a discussion of the level of
100. Commentators are in conflict as to what, if any, standard of constitutional review
was applied in Jenness. Compare Note, supra note 34, at 981 ("the fact that the court sustained the statute indicates that the test employed was closer to rational relation test than to
compelling state interest test") and Comment, supra note 73, at 1307 (test used was one
between strict scrutiny and the rational basis test) with Sims, supra note 49, at 172 (rationality test) and Rada, Cardwell & Friedman, supra note 68, at 804-05 (a hybrid standard employing Williams' totality of circumstances approach) and Jardine, supra note 62, at 298
("the opinion provided no test of constitutionality").
101. 403 U.S. at 438 (distinguishing Williams because of the overall openness of the
Georgia system as compared with the harshness of the challenged Ohio restrictions in
Williams).
102. Id. at 439.
103. Id. at 438-40.
104. Id. at 442. The important state interest was the requirement of "some preliminary
showing of a significant modicum of support" before granting ballot access. Id.
105. The following statement by the Court further supports the theory that Jenness employed a balancing approach:
The 5% figure is, to be sure, apparently somewhat higher than the percentage of
support required to be shown in many States as a condition for ballot position, but
this is balanced by the fact that Georgia has imposed no arbitrary restrictions
whatever upon the eligibility of any registered voter to sign as many nominating
petitions as he wishes.
Id. at 442. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
106. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
107. Id. at 136-40.
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scrutiny that was properly applicable. 108 The Court held that because the statute had a "real and appreciable impact" 109 on the exercise of voting rights by patently excluding candidates "lacking both
personal wealth and affluent backers . . . no matter how qualified
they might be, and no matter how broad or enthusiastic their popular support,"110 it had to be "closely scrutinzed."'' 1 Although the
Court's use of "close scrutiny" sounds like the upper-tier strict scrutiny-compelling interest test, a further examination reveals a significant divergence between the two. Bullock only required the laws to
be "found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate
state objectives" to be upheld. 1 2 In contrast, the classic formulation
of the strict scrutiny test requires that the law must be "necessary to
promote a compelling state interest."113 Ultimately, the Bullock
Court invalidated the statute due to the statute's lack of reasonable
necessity and precision as well as the absence of alternative means to
gain ballot access.1 1'
When the Supreme Court decided two more ballot access cases
in 1974, it compounded, rather than clarified, the inherent ambiguities in the standard of review established in the earlier ballot access
cases. In Storer v. Brown115 and American Party v. White,118 the
Court purportedly applied strict scrutiny analysis to uphold the challenged statutes.1 1 7 There are several factors in the Storer opinion,
however, which indicate that the strict scrutiny test was diluted, and,
in fact, more closely resembled the third-tier balancing approach,
than the pure upper-tier form of analysis.1 18 First, the Storer Court
108. Id. at 142-44.
109. Id. at 144.
110. Id. at 143.
111. Id. at 144.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (emphasis
added); see supra text accompanying note 65; see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342
(1972). For a discussion of the conceptual problems caused by the introduction of reasonableness into the close scrutiny tests, see Comment, supra note 73, at 1309-10.
114. See 405 U.S. at 146-49.
115. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
116. 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
117. See 415 U.S. at 736; 415 U.S. at 780. See also 415 U.S. at 755-56 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
118. One commentator has argued that Storer and American Party represented the first

time the Supreme Court has ever found the state interest to be compelling and, therefore, "the
Court may be willing to dilute the strict scrutiny standard in order to uphold state legislation

impinging upon ballot-access rights." See Note, supra note 34, at 981 (citing Comment, supra
note 73, at 1295 and The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARM. L. REv. 41, 95 (1974)). But
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states that there is "no litmus-paper test" for separating valid ballot
access requirements from those which may be potentially invalid
under the equal protection clause. 11 9 Second, the Court states in
dicta that it is likely that most state election laws would pass constitutional "muster under our cases. "120 Since this is contrary to the
widely accepted notion that it is practically impossible for a statute
to be constitutionally upheld under the rigid strict scrutiny test, 21
the Storer Court, following the equal protection analysis in Williams, Jenness and Bullock, must have envisioned that those cases
were not applying the test in its pure form. Third, the Court stressed
the fact that the "rule" provided by previous ballot access cases is
not outcome determinative in its application since there "is no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made." 122 Furthermore,
Justice White followed these statements by quoting the implicit balancing approach first enunciated in Williams, which considers the
"facts and circumstances behind the law," the state interest the statute allegedly protects and the individual interests infringed by the
statute.123 Fourth, in evaluating the challenged one-year disaffiliation
provision, 24 the Court found that the state had a compelling state
interest in the stability of its political system that "outweigh[ed] the
interest the candidate and his supporters may have in making a late
...decision to seek independent ballot status. 125 What is particularly significant about this evaluation is that the Court essentially
concluded its inquiry after balancing the state and individual interests, without making the usually requisite examination demanded by
the pure strict scrutiny test as to whether or not there were less drastic means available to serve the compelling state interest.1 26 Alsee Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1945) (Court used strict scrutiny to uphold
state statute). For an extensive discussion of how American Party used a diluted strict scrutiny
standard, see Comment, supra note 73, at 1319-25.
119. 415 U.S. at 730.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
122. 415 U.S. at 730.
123. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968); see supra text accompanying notes
90-91.
124. This statute prevented an independent candidate from gaining general ballot access
if he had been affiliated with any political party for the year immediately preceding the direct
primary election. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6830 (West Supp. 1981). It is important to note
that this statute has never been applied to presidential candidates. See infra notes 202-04 and
accompanying text.
125. 415 U.S. at 736.
126. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. As Justice Brennan aptly indicates in
his Storer dissent, the majority's use of the analysis employed in Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410
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though Storer was unique among ballot access cases in explicitly
finding a state interest to be compelling and upholding the challenged restrictions, the standard of review employed by the Court is
in many ways consistent with the prior ballot access cases which employed a third-tier balancing approach.
127
Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,
decided in 1979, represents the least ambiguous application of the
strict scrutiny standard to a ballot access case. The Court invalidated a statute which imposed significantly greater signature requirements in city, town, or county elections than in state elections. 128 In so doing, the Court rested its decision on the premise that
when such "vital individual rights [of association and voting] are at
stake" the precedential significance of Storer, American Party, and
Williams demands the imposition of a compelling interest test. 29
Specifically, the Court found that "[t]he signature requirements...
are plainly not the least restrictive means of protecting the State's
objectives. .

.

. [The defendant] has advanced no reason, much less

a compelling one, why the State needs a more stringent requirement
for Chicago [than for the State itself] ."130 Thus, the Court appears
to apply the strict scrutiny test in its unadulterated form.' 3 ' It is
significant to note, however, that according to the Court's own citations, 3 2 the standard of review it applied in Illinois Board was mandated by the diluted balancing approaches of Storer and Williams. 13 3 Furthermore, the Court began its equal protection analysis
by citing favorably the oft-quoted balancing factors of Williams.1
Therefore, it is possible that Illinois Board's standard of review appeared to be that of pure strict scrutiny only because the balancing
in favor of the plaintiff was so overwhelming.
Even if a balancing test was not implicitly employed by the maU.S. 752 (1973), that "the Constitution does not require the State to choose ineffectual means
to achieve its aims," 415 U.S. at 736, is a "wholly inadequate" analysis which fails to satisfy
the less drastic means examination. Id. at 760 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority's citation to Rosario may be particularly telling since the Rosario Court applied a lenient standard
resembling the traditional rational relation test and, as a result, there was no need for a less
drastic means inquiry. See Rosario, 410 U.S. at 767 (Powell, J., dissenting).
127. 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
128. Id. at 175-77.
129. Id. at 184.
130. Id. at 186.
131. See supra text accompanying note 65.
132. 440 U.S. at 184.
133. See supra notes 90-95, 115-26 and accompanying text.
134. 440 U.S. at 183. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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jority in Illinois Board, the use of such an approach was recommended explicitly by Justice Blackmun in his Illinois Board concurring opinion. 135 He joined in the Court's opinion and "its strictscrutiny approach for election cases, '138 but criticized the Court's
use of such ambiguous terms as "compelling state interest" and "less
drastic means." 13 7 Justice Blackmun reasoned that if the strict scrutiny standard is to be a constitutional test at all, and not just a "signal of the result the Court has chosen to reach," 3 8 then it must inherently involve a "balancingprocess."139
The selection and application of the proper equal protection
standard mandated by the ballot access cases has not only perplexed
academicians and commentators but has created widely divergent
views among the Justices themselves. The confusion produced by
these linguistic and conceptual ambiguities1 40 has evinced the need
for one clear standard to be applicable in all ballot access cases. This
standard of review, embracing the implicit balancing tests of the
Court's past decisions, should weigh the state interests against the
constitutional interests of the candidates and voters who are affected
by the statute. Such a balancing test should not merely examine the
opposing interests in the abstract, but must consider both the practical extent of the burden imposed upon the constitutional interests of
the candidate and his supporters as well as the actual efficiency of
the statute in fulfilling its underlying purpose. This type of analytical
approach would not function as an outcome determinative test, signalling "the result the Court has chosen to reach," 1 4 ' but would require the courts to explicate the rationale of their decision. This is
true because the courts would no longer be able to engage in the
conclusory analysis facilitated by the traditional two-tier test with its
vague phrases such as "compelling state interest," "less drastic
means," or "rational relation.' 42 The proposed balancing standard
will not only foster clarity of analysis and facilitate the lower courts'
application of election law precedent, 43 but will help enable a court,
135. Id. at 188-89 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 188 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 188-89 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 188 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. See supra notes 59-139 and accompanying text.
141. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
142. See supra notes 59-72, 136-39 and accompanying text.
143. But see Jardine, supra note 62, at 313-14. Although Jardine cites many positive
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by weighing the important and competing interests, to reach the
judgment demanded by justice.
III.

APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
TO FILING DEADLINE CASES

Having reached a conclusion as to the proper analytical framework in which to examine ballot access restrictions, this present inquiry must now determine what specific interests are, in fact, affected by the filing deadline statutes. Once these various concerns
are identified, the importance of the state interests and the statute's
effectiveness in fulfilling these interests may be balanced against the
nature of the burden imposed by the statute upon the candidates and
voters rights.
A. State Interests
There are four possible interests that have been asserted by
states in support of their challenged filing deadline statutes: (1) facilitating administrative efficiency, (2) promoting voter awareness,
(3) preventing voter confusion, and (4) maintaining political
stability.
1. Administrative Efficiency.-From an administrative standpoint, one obvious reason to require a filing deadline at all, is to allow adequate time for the physical preparation of the ballot."" Additionally, where candidates are seeking to qualify for the ballot via
the petition process, the state needs time to investigate and verify the
authenticity of the signatures in order to insure compliance with the
various quantitative and qualitative requirements.145 Although the
importance of such state interests is evident, the logic of an argument that postulates administrative purposes as support for a filing
deadline statute becomes greatly attenuated as the deadline date
falls further away from the actual time period needed to perform
these tasks adequately. In fact, such asserted state interests rarely
aspects of a balancing approach for ballot access decisions, he believes that it may also produce greater uncertainty and lack of predictability in lower courts' application of such a test.
Much of this unpredictability, however, may be caused by the courts' balancing of the circumstances surrounding each case instead of reaching an a priori decision by rigidly applying one
extreme of the two-tier test; as such, some uncertainty is unavoidable and necessary.
144. See Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258, 1267 (E.D. Penn. 1975), afd mem., 424
U.S. 959 (1976).
145.

See id.; Whig Party v. Siegelman, 500 F. Supp 1195, 1206 (N.D. Ala. 1980); Ash-

worth v. Fortson, 424 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (M.D. Ga. 1976). See also Rock v. Bryant, 459 F.
Supp. 64, 73 (E.D. Ark. 1978), afrd, 590 F.2d 340 (1979).
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have been considered sufficient justification in their own right for
upholding filing deadlines that occurred significantly in advance of
the time needed for physical ballot preparation.146 Typically, in cases
where there was an early filing deadline, the state either failed to
present evidence probative of the administrative rationale 47 or did
not even attempt such a justification due to the improbability of its
success. 148 Thus, in most cases challenging filing deadline statutes,
unless the date is relatively near the November election, 149 the state
interest in administrative efficiency will carry little, if any, persuasive
impact.
2. Voter Awareness.-Another interest which states have invoked in defense of early filing deadlines is that of voter awareness.
This argument is premised upon the belief that the earlier the voters
receive information about the electoral field, the better the opportunity they will have for careful selection and evaluation of the respective candidates. 150 Although this is certainly an important concern, it
is arguable, in light of modern forms of communication and transportation, as well as the extensive media coverage of political campaigns, that voter awareness does not justify an unduly early filing
deadline."5 ' Even assuming arguendo, that contemporary technology
146. See, e.g., Anderson v. Morris, 500 F. Supp. 1095, 1100 (D. Md. 1980), affd, 636
F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1980); Salem v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258, 1267 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affd
mem., 424 U.S. 959 (1976). But see Ashworth v. Fortson, 424 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (N.D. Ga.
1976), which upheld a June 9 filing deadline because of, inter alia, the administrative needs of
verifying and processing the petitions. Id. at 1182. However, the Ashworth court stated in
dicta that "some improvement may be had in the overall scheme by moving the filing date for
independent candidates and minor political organizations to a time closer to the general election." Id. at 1183.
147. See Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258, 1267 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affd mem., 424
U.S. 959 (1976). The state could not prove its administrative justification in Salera because
the evidence revealed that actual ballot preparation did not begin until months after the filing
deadline had occurred.
148. See, e.g., Anderson v. Morris, 500 F. Supp. 1095, 1100 (D. Md..1980), affd, 636
F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1980); Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730, 733 (D. Me. 1980), a ffd
mem., 634 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1980).
149. Aside from Ashworth v. Fortson, 424 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ga. 1975), which is
anomalous, it is not clear what date is sufficiently close to the November election to sustain the
state's administrative interest. For a case which struck down an August 12 filing date and
found that any administrative burden in placing a presidential candidate on the ballot as late
as September 24 was "far outweighed by the loss of plaintiff's rights," see McCarthy v. Noel,
420 F. Supp. 799, 805 (D.R.I. 1976).
150. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554, 564 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102
S. Ct. 2035 (1982); Pratt v. Begley, 352 F. Supp. 328, 330 (E.D. Ky. 1970), affd mem., 409
U.S. 943 (1972).
151. Although this argument falls short of completely refuting the state justification, it
does raise a significant question concerning the "efficiency" of a filing statute in achieving this
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has not greatly facilitated achievement of this state interest,15 2 there
is still a valid criticism of this state justification. Namely, if the filing
deadline requires only the independent and third party candidates to
declare their official candidacies by the required date, the deadline
will only marginally increase voters' knowledge, since voters may
still be unaware of the identities of the major party candidates in the
election.1 53 Assuming that a filing deadline statute requires only independents to file early, the different deadlines may be more justifiable as a means of providing information to the voters, although it
would still be subject to the preceding criticism. Such an argument is
premised on the belief that voters have some inherent knowledge
about the partisan candidate's positions from his party label, while
their knowledge of the independent is limited to that which derives
from him solely as an individual."" Thus, the state interest in promoting voter awareness may be furthered by providing more time to
inform the electorate concerning the independent candidate and his
1 55
stance on the issues.
One state has argued that its interest in voter awareness extends
beyond fostering intelligent voting to assisting voters in "mak[ing]
informed choices about where to allocate their [financial or volunteer] support."15 However, this justification of filing deadlines similarly is subject to a critique based upon the effectiveness of a filing
statute that only requires the minor candidates to register officially
for the ballot at an early date. Furthermore, despite one court's approval of such a rationale, 5 ' it is questionable whether a state
should have an interest in what is tantamount to procurring financial
goal. See Joseph v. City of Birmingham, 510 F. Supp. 1319, 1337 (E.D. Mich. 1981). But see
Pratt v. Begley, 352 F. Supp. 328, 330 (E.D. Ky. 1970) (seven month period for public evalua-

tion of candidates not unreasonable in light of the geography of Kentucky, rural transportation
facilities, and slow means of communication as compared to the predominately metropolitan
state), affd mem., 409 U.S. 943 (1972).
152. See Pratt v. Begley, 352 F. Supp. 328, 330 (E.D. Ky. 1970), af'd mem., 409 U.S.
943 (1972).

153. See Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258, 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem., 424
U.S. 959 (1976). For example, a candidate such as General Dwight Eisenhower (in his 1952
campaign) could sit out the entire Republican or Democratic primary and still be put on a
major party ballot as late as August or September. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp.
121, 129 (S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2035
(1982).
154. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554, 567 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102
S. Ct. 2035 (1982).
155. See id.
156. Id. at 564.
157. See id.
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and volunteer support for candidates. Whether a candidate wishes to
obtain volunteer support at an early date is an interest of the individual, not of a state.
3. Voter Confusion.-The Supreme Court has recognized that
the state has an "important, ' 158 "legitimate," 159 or "compelling" 1 60
interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot so as to
avoid "confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic
process at the general election." 61 This state interest is grounded
upon the concern that a "plethora of political parties"16 2 and candidates on the ballot would not only bewilder the voters, but would
"make increasingly difficult the election of candidates with majority
support from the electorate without resort to run-off elections and
the attendant expense to the state that they would create."' 6 As a
result, states have devised various means of evaluating candidates'
seriousness in order to weed out frivolous candidates who unnecessarily clog the ballot. Although "[tihe means of testing the seriousness
of a given candidacy may be open to debate,"' ' the means used to
achieve this end (as with other state interests) must not "unfairly or
unnecessarily burden either a minority party's or an individual candidate's equally important interest in the continued availability of
politicial opportunity."1 65
Before examining how filing deadline statutes may further this
state interest, it is helpful to understand how the courts have analyzed this interest in the context of quantitative signature restrictions
on nominating petitions. The Supreme Court has said that a state
158. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
159. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
160. American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n.14 (1974). See also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974) (state interest is of the highest order).
161. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
162. Wood v. Putterman, 316 F. Supp. 646, 650 (D. Md. 1970), affd, 400 U.S. 859
(1970).
163. Id. See also supra notes 158-60. But see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33
(1968) (the danger of voter confusion created by the "existence of multitudinous fragmentary
groups [is] no more than 'theoretically imaginable' ").
164. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974). States have used at least three methods: "initial showing of minimum support such as voter nominating petitions; the payment of
filing fees; or compliance with form deadlines." Jardine, supra note 62, at 304.
165. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974). Compare McCarthy v. Kirkpatrick,
420 F. Supp. 366, 373 (W.D. Mo. 1976) ("a balance must be struck so that frivolous candidates are restricted while serious candidates are provided an opportunity to secure a place on
the ballot") with Arutunoff v. Oklahoma State Bd. of Election, 687 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (10th
Cir. 1982) (reasonable level of support requirements designed to avoid voter confusion and
burdensome run-off elections are constitutionally valid if they are not "unduly oppressive").
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may legitimately require a candidate to indicate his seriousness by
demonstrating a significant level of community support.'"6 In Storer
6 8 the Court promulgated a test
v. Brown167 and Mandel v. Bradley,"
to assess whether the statutory means designed to serve this interest
are too burdensome, despite the importance of the state interest:
[I]n the context of [the state's] politics, could a reasonably diligent
independent candidate be expected to satisfy the signature requirements, or will it be only rarely that the unaffiliated candidate will
succeed in getting on the ballot? Past experience will be helpful, if
not always an unerring, guide: it will be one thing if the independent candidates have qualified with some regularity and quite a
different matter if they have not."6 9
Although the underlying rationale of this test is commendable and in
accord with a third-tier balancing approach (i.e., weighing the actual
burdens imposed by the statute in preventing diligent candidates
from obtaining ballot access with the state interest of avoiding voter
confusion by weeding out frivolous candidates), to the degree that
this test relies on small statistical samples indicative of past experience, it may be an insufficient basis upon which to infer definitive
conclusions.17 0 In fact, when Mandel was remanded' 7 ' and the reasonable diligence test was applied, the lower court could not draw
firm inferences from the limited statistical data it possessed concerning past candidates' success under the challenged filing restrictions. 12 Furthermore, the district court on remand was troubled by
comparing the successful compliance with the challenged filing restrictions by independent candidates for a local office with that of
candidates for statewide offices, since "vast differences [exist] ...
with respect to media coverage, campaign costs, need to make
[one]self known and the types of issues on which to campaign,' ' 17 3
74
which are not accounted for in a direct mathematical comparison.
166.

See Clements v. Fashing, 102 S. Ct. 2836, 2844 (1982); American Party v. White,

415 U.S. 767, 782 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 743 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403

U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
167.

415 U.S. 724 (1974).

168.

432 U.S. 173 (1977), remanded, 449 F. Supp. 983 (D. Md. 1978).

169.

Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 742 (1974), quoted in Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S.

173, 177 (1977).
170.
171.

See Bradley v. Mandel, 449 F. Supp. 983, 988 (D. Md. 1978).
449 F. Supp. 983 (D. Md. 1978).

172. Id. at 988.
173.

Id.

174.

Id.
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Thus, any benefit that can be derived from using the reasonable diligence test to assess the burden of quantitative signature requirements is limited by both the quantity of the statistical data available
concerning the challenged restriction and its relevance to the specific
type of elective position sought by the plaintiff-candidate.
Assuming arguendo that the state interest in avoiding laundrylist ballots is furthered by filing deadline statutes, the question arises
as to whether the reasonably diligent candidate test should apply in
an assessment of the burdensome effects of a filing deadline on an
excluded plaintiff. In Anderson v. Celebrezze,17 5 the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that this test is "peculiarly well-suited" 11' to measuring the
burden imposed upon candidates to gather the requisite amount of
signatures within specific time limits, but concluded that it is of little
use in measuring the difficulty imposed upon the candidates by compliance with a filing deadline, in and of itself.17 7 The rationale for
this distinction is that the burden created by signature requirements
(i.e., difficulty in persuading a sufficient number of voters to sign the
nominating petition) is fundamentally different from the burden created by a filing deadline (i.e., difficulty in deciding to run for election
at an early date). 17 18 Thus, the diligence in a candidate's attempt to
gather the required amount of signatures, once he decides to run, is
burden created by forcing him to decide to run at
irrelevant to the 179
date.
a
early
too
Even if the reasonably diligent candidate test is inapplicable to
filing deadline controversies, this does not automatically preclude the
possibility that the same state interest which furthers signature re175. 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982).
176. 664 F.2d at 562.
177. Id. It is worth noting that when the other courts in the Anderson cases considered
the issue, they also found the reasonably diligent candidate test to be inapplicable or of minimal significance to the filing deadline controversy. See Anderson v. Morris, 500 F. Supp. 1095,
1099 (D. Md.), affid, 636 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1980) (district court rejected the defendant's
contention that Anderson must satisfy, initially, the reasonably diligent candidate inquiry and
was willing to consider such an inquiry only after the defendant proved a compelling state
interest, which he could not do; circuit court based its affirmance primarily on the district
court's opinion and did not mention the test); Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730, 732-33
n.6 (D. Me.), arid mem., 634 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1980) (reasonable diligence test is
inapplicable).
178.

See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554, 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102

S. Ct. 2035 (1982); infra notes 206-21 and accompanying text.
179. See 664 F.2d at 562. For an argument that the reasonable diligence test should
only be "nominally important" in determining the constitutionality of state statutes, where the
candidate's ability to satisfy the ballot access requirement is viewed theoretically, see Note,
supra note 34, at 990.
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quirements, (i.e., avoiding voter confusion by screening out frivolous
candidates) may not likewise justify early filing deadlines. According
to this view, a serious (or reasonably diligent) candidate will not only
be able to demonstrate the necessary level of community support to
satisfy the signature requirements, but will decide to run at a sufficiently early time so as to submit his nominating petition prior to the
filing deadline. 180
Although this argument has some surface appeal, a proper inquiry must consider the effectiveness of the statute in furthering the
state interest. It is undoubtedly true that there may be some frivolous candidates who decide half-heartedly after the filing deadline to
run for office. A filing deadline which would exclude such candidates
would be effectively advancing the important state interest of weeding out such trivial candidates. The same statute, however, would
also arbitrarily exclude any individual who decided to become a candidate one day following the filing deadline, regardless of the seriousness of his candidacy or the level of community support he could
demonstrate.' Thus, to the degree that a filing deadline statute furthers the state interest in measuring a candidate's seriousness, it does
so in an over-inclusive manner.8 2 Therefore, when balancing the
state interest of avoiding voter confusion with the candidate and his
supporters' interest that is infringed by the statute, one must examine whether the benefits of excluding frivolous candidates in such
a manner outweighs the over-inclusive adverse effects upon serious
83
candidates.'
180. See Rock v. Bryant, 459 F. Supp. 64, 74 (E.D. Ark.), arfd mem., 590 F.2d 340
(8th Cir. 1978). See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554, 565 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted,
102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982).
181. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 139 (S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 664
F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982); McCarthy v. Noel, 420 F.
Supp. 799, 803 (D.R.I. 1976).
182. McCarthy v. Noel, 420 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1976).1
The early deadline arbitrarily cuts off some candidacies in the same crude, overinclusive manner that high filing fees did in Lubin v. Panish. It suffers the same
defect; it does not work. Whatever spurious and frivolous candidates the Rhode Island scheme has weeded out, it has also put an end to a serious, legitimate candidacy. Early filing is unreliable as a test of the genuineness of a candidacy. Indeed,
the most committed independent candidate is often the independent who, dissatisfied
with what the major party conventions offer, runs as a third-party or independent
candidate.
Id. at 803 (footnote and citations omitted).
183. Of course, there is a point close to election time when a line must be drawn distinguishing serious and frivolous candidates in order to allow sufficient time for the physical preparation of the ballot. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text. Such a state justification
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4. PoliticalStability.-The fourth state interest that arguably
supports a filing deadline for independent and third party candidates
prior to the selection of major party candidates is the state's concern
in maintaining political stability. In Storer v. Brown, the Court
found this interest to be compelling'" and upheld a one-year disaffiliation provision. 185 The actual statute barred an independent candidate from gaining access to the general ballot if he was affiliated
with a qualified political party 86 within one year preceding the direct party primary.18 7 Since the primary was held in June, the effect
of this statute was that a person could run as an independent candidate only if he had been unaffiliated with a qualified party for a
period of seventeen months prior to the general election. 8 8 The policy underlying the challenged provision, maintaining political stability, was effectuated by the statute insofar as it prevented the "integrity" of the direct party primary process from being compromised:
[The direct party primary] functions to winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates. The State's general policy is to
have contending forces within the party employ the primary campaign and primary election to finally settle their differences. The
general election ballot is reserved for major struggles; it is not a
forum for continuing intraparty feuds. The provision against defeated primary candidates running as independents effectuates this
aim, the visible result being to prevent the losers from continuing
the struggle and to limit the names on the ballot to those who have
won the primaries and to those independents properly qualified.
It protects the direct party primary process by refusing to recognize independent candidates who do not make early plans to
leave a party and take the alternative course to the ballot. It works
against independent candidacies prompted by short-range goals,
pique or personal quarrel. It is also a substantial barrier to a party
fielding an "independent" candidate to capture and bleed off votes
in the general election that might well go to another party. 1 9
will have the effect of precluding frivolous candidates, but will not be over-inclusive.
184. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974). See also supra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
185. Storer, 415 U.S. at 736; see supra note 124.
186. See CAL. ELEC. CODE. § 6430, quoted in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 749-50,
(current version at CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6430 (West 1977)) (definition of a qualified party).
187. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6430(d) (West Supp. 1974), quoted in Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. at 752, (current version at CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6830(c) (West. Supp. 1982)).
188. Storer, 415 U.S. at 758 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 735.
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This clear and resounding language of the Storer Court establishes that the state has an important interest in promoting political
stability by excluding those candidates who have unsuccessfully
sought their party's nomination or were recently affiliated with a political party from running as independents. It has been unsuccessfully argued that a filing deadline statute may further this interest in
political stability by functioning as a de facto disaffiliation and/or
"sore loser" provision. 190 If this argument is correct, then independent presidential candidates such as John Anderson, who was affiliated with the Republican party and sought its nomination immediately before he declared his independent candidacy, should be barred
from the general ballot solely due to his non-compliance with a
state's filing deadline.191 However, there are at least two major flaws
in this argument.
First, a typical filing deadline statute, as exemplified by the
statutes in two of the Anderson cases, neither indicates on its face
nor in its legislative history that it was intended to function as a
disaffiliation or a "sore loser" provision.1 92 A statute that merely prohibits an individual from running as an independent candidate, if the
candidate does not file his nominating petition by March 20,193
would neither "bar the staunchest party member who decided on
March 19 to change horses and file as an independent . . . nor

would it permit a true independent to run, if he or she filed on
March 21. ' l Such a statute designed purportedly to further political stability by functioning as a disaffiliation statute would be
greatly inefficient, since it is both over-inclusive (excluding unaffiliated candidates who decide to run after the deadline date), and
under-inclusive (not excluding affiliated candidates who decide to
190. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 135 (S.D. Ohio 1980), revd, 664
F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982); Anderson v. Morris, 636 F.2d
55, 57-59 (4th Cir. 1980); Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730, 733 (D. Me.), affd mem.,
634 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1980); Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258, 1267 (E.D. Pa. 1975),
arfd mem., 424 U.S. 959 (1976). See also Williams v. Tucker, 382 F. Supp. 381, 386-88
(M.D. Pa. 1974). A "sore loser" provision is a statute which would explicitly prevent a loser of
a primary from running in the general election. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 8-2
(1976).
191. This argument was rejected in three of the Anderson cases, see supra note 190, and
was not the basis for the Sixth Circuit's reversal in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554 (6th
Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982).
192. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 135 (S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d
554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 2035 (1982); Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp.
730, 734 & n.8 (D. Me.), aff'd mem., 634 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1980).
193. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.257 (Page Supp. 1981).
194. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. at 135.
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run as independents prior to the deadline date). Thus, unlike the
Storer statute which was clearly drafted as a disaffiliation and sore
loser provision and achieved those ends efficiently, the typical filing
deadline as exemplified by those challenged in the Anderson cases,
function "as a disaffiliation provision only by mere happenstance, not
by any reasonably discernible legislative design." 1 5
Additional support for the theory that the filing deadline statutes in the Anderson cases were not intended to function as disaffiliation or sore loser provisions may be inferred by the fact that in four
of the states where Anderson was initially excluded from the ballot,
there were statutes specifically intended to fulfill such legislative purposes.1 9 Although for different reasons, the disaffiliation statutes
19
were found inapplicable to bar Anderson's independent candidacy, 7
their existence suggests that when the legislators enacted the filing
deadlines without any overt reference to such policies they likely intended the filing deadline to achieve other ends. Thus, in light of
other statutes' explicit treatment of this state interest and the general lack of precision in which a filing deadline would function as a
disaffiliation provision, the argument that the filing deadline statute
was intended to serve these state interests as part of a comprehensive
statutory scheme is not very persuasive.198
The second major problem with the argument that filing deadline statutes further political stability by functioning as a disaffiliation provision is limited to the context of presidential candidates. As
noted earlier, the facts of Storer concerned a state direct party pri195. Id. See also Anderson v. Morris, 500 F. Supp. at 1102.
196. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 493 (1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 8-2
(1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-8-19, 1-10-7 (1978 & Supp. 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3513.04 (Page Supp. 1981).
197. In Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. at 135, the "sore loser" statute
prohibit[ed] a candidate from seeking a place on the general election ballot by
means of nominating petition or by write-in when he has filed a declaration of candidacy for a party nomination in the preceding primary. Because Anderson withdrew from the Ohio primary in time to have his name removed from the ballot the
State concede[d] that [OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.04 (Page Supp. 1981) did]
not apply to him.
Id. In the other three Anderson cases, the different sore loser and/or disaffiliation statutes
were inapplicable to Anderson because he was a presidential candidate. See Anderson v. Morris, 636 F.2d at 58; Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. at 734 n.8; Anderson v. Hooper, 495 F.
Supp. at 903.
198. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. at 135. But see Williams v. Tucker, 382
F. Supp. 381, 386-87 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (which held that a filing deadline statute, a statute
limiting when signatures could be collected and a statute prohibiting petitioning candidates
from entering the primary, function collectively as disaffiliation and sore loser provisions).
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mary and not a presidential primary. 199 A direct party primary, such
as that in Storer, is conducted entirely statewide and is completely
binding on the party; 20 0 whereas a presidential primary is conducted
throughout many states and does not bind the national party as a
whole. 01 It is also "undisputed '20 2 that the actual disaffiliation provision litigated in Storer has never been applied to presidential candidates.20 3 Furthermore, the Storer Court's analysis repeatedly emphasized the nature of a direct party primary and made no explicit
reference to the applicability of its rationale in a presidential context.204 Thus, one may infer that the Storer rationale is limited to
only statewide direct party primaries.
Beyond these factual distinctions and negative inferences, there
is a very important policy issue of promoting political stability in
general that tends to undermine the argument that the rationale of
Storer supports early filing deadlines acting as a de facto disaffiliation provision. 20 5 However, since much of this counter-argument focuses on the individual's interest and the burden placed thereon, it
will be addressed in the following subsection.
B. Individual Interests
There are two major types of burdens imposed upon the constitutional interests 206 of individuals by early filing deadline restric199. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 734-35 (1974); supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
200. See Anderson v. Babb, 632 F.2d 300, 305-06 n.2 (4th Cir. 1980).

201.

Id. Although the primary results in many states are binding on their state delegates

for, at least, the first round of the convention, one state's decision as to who shall be the
candidate is in no way binding on the entire party or other states. See J. DAvis, PRESIMNIAL
PRIMARIES 39, 69-70 (1980).
202. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. at 135.
203. Id. It is also worth noting that the Celebrezze district court could not find any state

with a disaffiliation statute which has been applied to a presidential candidate. Id.
204. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Anderson v. Babb, 632 F. 2d 300, 30506 n.2 (4th Cir. 1980). Although any reference to a presidential primary would have been

dicta, considering the fact that two of the other Storer plaintiffs (Hall and Tyner) challenging
signature requirements were presidential and vice-presidential candidates, it would not have

been inappropriate for the court to do so if they believed it applicable. See Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. at 726-28.
205. See infra notes 207-21 and accompanying text, discussing how political stability is
furthered by providing minority political groups with the opportunity of ballot access unfettered by restrictive, early deadlines. Furthermore, this section explicates how, in a presidential

election, the political stability gained by coalition building within the two major parties is
promoted by filing deadlines following the national conventions.

206. For a discussion of the relevant first amendment interests of the individual, see
supra notes 33-58 and accompanying text.
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tions. The first is the practical difficulty imposed upon independent
or third party candidates by an early filing deadline prior to the major party's primaries, since they must decide whether to run for election before the issues have "crystallized" or the identities of their
major party opponents are known.207 Thus, in effect, such an individual must make the crucial decision of whether or not to initiate a
candidacy in a virtual political vacuum. Second, there is a fundamental policy problem with these restrictions to the extent that filing
deadlines bar serious independent or third party candidates, the state
is effectively silencing a form of political dissent essential to our
democratic process. 0 8
The indispensable role which independent and third party candidates play in the democratic process 20 9 has been duly acknowl207. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. at 129; Bradley v. Mandel, 449 F. Supp.
at 986; Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 758 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But cf Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d at 565 (even though the issues have not yet crystallized, "[i]t is little enough
to ask of a person seeking one of the most powerful and influential posts on earth that he make
up his mind whether to run seven and one-half months before the election"). In Bradley v.
Mandel (where the plaintiff was a United States senatorial candidate), the court noted that
the early filing date also makes it more difficult for an independent (or third party) candidate
to attract media coverage, financial contributions, and the voter support necessary to gather
sufficient signatures for the nominating petition. Bradley, 449 F. Supp. at 986-87. Although
this may be true in some United States senatorial contests and certainly is true in many statewide and local contests, this is not necessarily the case in presidential elections, at least with
respect to media coverage, which may begin as early as the first statewide primary election.
Nevertheless, even when media coverage begins quite early in presidential elections, it is usually focused on the major party candidates, not the small third party or independent candidates. See J. DAvis, supra note 201, at 83-91.
208. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968); id. at 39-40 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
The underlying premises in the textual argument are as follows: (i) Independent and third
party candidates play a crucial role in the political process by providing a legitimate outlet for
dissident views; (ii) Independent and third party candidacies often reflect certain voters' dissatisfaction with the major party candidates and are often initiated in response to the final selection of party candidates and the crystallization of election issues following the primaries; (iii)
Early filing deadlines, prior to the primaries, may prevent these candidates from gaining ballot
access; (iv) Therefore, early filing deadlines silence the politically dissenting third party and
independent candidates and jeopardize the democratic process. See infra notes 209-19 and
accompanying text.
209.

See W. HESSELTINE, THIRD PARTY MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1962):

Few "third" parties have conducted national campaigns and only a bare half-dozen
can truthfully be said to have influenced national elections. Yet, by voicing grievances and by proposing panaceas, third parties have exerted significant influence
upon the policies and programs of major parties. In a curiously anomalous manner,
third parties have bolstered the traditional American two-party system.
Important figures in American political history such as Presidents Martin Van Buren, Millard
Fillmore, and Theodore Roosevelt as well as Governors Robert LaFollette and George Wallace
have all at one time been third party or independent candidates. Sims, s.upra note 49, at 155-
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edged by the Supreme Court:
All political ideas cannot and should not be channeled into the programs of our two major parties. History has amply proved the virtue of political activity by minority, dissident groups, who innumerable times have been in the vanguard of democratic thought and
whose programs were ultimately accepted. .

.

. The absence of

210
such voices would be a symptom of grave illness in our society.

Yet, these dissident minority voices, embodied in third party and independent candidates, are being stifled by forced compliance with
deadlines far in advance of the political circumstances which give
rise to the need for these alternative ideologies. That is to say, the
"popular dissatisfaction with the functioning of the [two-party] system sufficient to produce third party movements and independent
candidacies [ordinarily] does not manifest itself until after the major
parties have adopted their platforms and nominated their candidates."211 Therefore, filing deadlines significantly in advance of major party primaries often require potential independent and third
party candidates not only to predict who their major party opponents
will be, but to foresee sudden, unexpected occurrences of great importance 212 which may, in a short period of time, dramatically affect
the political arena and significantly influence voters' evaluation of
the major issues.2 13 Part of the Williams rationale focused precisely
on this paradox:
Since the principal policies of the major parties change to some
extent from year to year, and since the identity of the likely major
party nominees may not be known until shortly before the election,
56. It is also worth noting that Theodore Roosevelt, presidential nominee of the Bull Moose
Party in 1912, was selected as the candidate only after he failed to receive the Republican
party nomination. See W. HESSELTINE, THE RISE AND FALL OF TMRD PARTIEs 26 (1957).
210. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957) (Warren, C.J.) (court
upheld the due process rights of "subversive persons" against the right of the legislators to be
informed on the subject of governmental self-preservation), quoted in Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184-85 (1979).
211. MacBride v. Exon, 558 F.2d 443, 449 (8th Cir. 1977).
212. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 181 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
213. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 758 (1974) (Brennan, J.,dissenting). See A. BICKEL,
REFORM AND CONTINUITY 88 (1971).
For administrative reasons, there has to be a cutoff date sometime, but there is more
than a little of the capricious in laws that force a commitment to act . . . before
such an upheaval as President Johnson's withdrawal [of his candidacy] on March
31, 1968, and . . . not to mention such an event as the assassination of Robert F.
Kennedy on June 5, 1968.
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this disaffected "group" [those who disagree with the major parties
and their policies] will rarely if ever be a cohesive or identifiable
group until a few months before the election. Thus, Ohio's burdensome procedures, requiring extensive organization and other election activities by a very early date, operate to prevent such a group
from ever getting on the ballot and the Ohio system thus denies the
"disaffected" not
only a choice of leadership but a choice on the
214
issues as well.
Though admittedly, the Williams Court was faced with more burdensome access requirements than just an early filing deadline,215 the
same analysis should apply because the law results in a similar temporal contradiction.21 6 To the degree that these "disaffected" individuals constitute a group of a size sufficient to satisfy the quantitative
signature requirements, their rights to associate and cast their vote
effectively are infringed if the candidate of their choice is excluded
from the ballot due to an unjustifiably early filing date.217 To the
extent that such voters' and candidates' rights are frustrated, the
state's interest in political stability is not furthered, but arguably
hindered. Political stability of our democratic process as a whole can
not possibly be promoted by denying the "vanguard of democratic
thought" 218 realistic access to the general ballot. Rather, at best, the
political stability of two particular parties, namely the Democrats
and the Republicans, is furthered by the exclusion of such candidates through their non-compliance with early filing dates which occur significantly in advance of the events which tend to give rise to
these alternative candidacies initially. Needless to say, such a state
interest (preservation of the political status quo) is antithetical to the
fundamental principles of democracy and is, therefore,
unacceptable. 1 9
Furthermore, even if one dismisses these policy concerns and assumes that early filing deadlines neither unfairly burden the interests
214. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968) (emphasis added).
215. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text. The temporal contradiction is simple: How can dissenting political voices effectively express their views through an independent
or third party candidate, months before the major party primaries, if these voices neither exist
nor are a cohesive political mechanism prior to their dissatisfaction with either the major party
nominees or the major parties' positions on newly emergent election issues or circumstances?
217. See, e.g., Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. at 731; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F.
Supp. at 125; see supra notes 33-58 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
219.

See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
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of these political dissenters nor frustrate the political stability of the
system as a whole, there is still a cogent argument that such statutes
do not further the state's interest in the stability of the party system.
Alexander Bickel has observed that filing deadlines that occur before
the major party primaries are actually counterproductive in furthering the essence of the two-party system, namely coalition building. 2
[T]he important third-party movements in our history . . . came
into being after the two major-party conventions, and were enabled
to come into being at that time because major-party conventions
used to be held much earlier than at present ....
The characteristic American third party . . . consists of a
group of people who have tried to exert influence within one of the
major parties, have failed, and later decide to work on the outside.
States in which there is an early qualifying date tend to force such
groups to create minor partieswithout first attempting to influence
the course taken by a major one. For a dissident group is put to a
choice of foregoing major-party primary and other prenomination
activity by organizing separately early on in an election year, or
losing all opportunity for action as a third party later.
From the point of view of fostering the two-party system this
is counterproductive. It is calculated to induce early third-party
movements. . . calculated to drive people away from the coalitionbuilding process that is the genius of the two-party system, and
into a premature and more likely permanent ideological separatism, which is precisely what the two-party system is intended to
prevent. 221
Thus, one may infer from Bickel that the two party system would
actually be furthered if filing deadlines followed the party primaries,
because the major parties would have sufficient opportunity to accommodate these dissenting views and perhaps prevent their factionalistic tendencies by constructing a coalition encompassing the various political perspectives. If all filing deadlines did indeed follow the
major party primaries, then the important interest of providing a political forum to all significant groups would be served; if the major
party could not accommodate the minority views, the possibility of a
third party or indepedent candidacy would still exist.
C. Equality Analysis
Assuming that the burden imposed by early filing deadlines
220.
221.

A. BICKEL, supra note 213, at 87-88.
Id. (emphasis added).
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upon this disaffected group of potential candidates and voters can
not be dismissed as de minimis, 222 a final issue must be addressed
before any conclusions can be drawn on the constitutionality of earlier filing deadlines for third party and independent candidates: Do
the inherent similarities between independent and major party candidates warrant use of a single filing deadline for all candidates? 23 Or
conversely, are these candidates so inherently dissimilar as to justify
different treatment?
In Anderson v. Celebrezze, the district court and the circuit
court discussed the issue at length and reached opposite conclusions. 2 The district court recognized that there are obvious differences between the needs of firmly rooted political parties and new
political organizations that may require different treatment and different ballot access routes. 225 Furthermore, the district court reasoned that to treat such unequals equally can produce equal protection violations that are just as invidious as treating equals
unequally. 226 Thus, it extrapolated that "there may be no invidious
discrimination between entities which are by nature to be handled
differently. 2 27 Yet, despite this analysis, the district court noted that
this logic overlooks the fact that where important interests are actually infringed, "statutory line-drawing . . . must be explicable in
terms of differences between the persons on either side of the
line. '' 221 It further reasoned that because both independent and partisan candidates' eventual electoral success depends largely on their
222.

See Clements v. Fashing, 102 S. Ct. 2836, 2846-48 (1982) (where the Court up-

held the constitutional validity of non-partisan ballot access restrictions which imposed a "do
minimis burden" upon governmental officials seeking state legislative office by applying the
rational relation test).
223.

For purposes of facilitating analysis of the conflicting arguments in both Anderson

v. Celebrezze opinions, the ensuing discussion will center on the distinction between independents and party candidates in general, (as opposed to independent and third party candidates
distinguished from major party candidates) since the former is the operative distinction focused upon by the challenged statute and analyzed by both courts. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3513.257 (Page Supp. 1981); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 128-30 (S.D. Ohio
1980), rev"d, 664 F.2d 554, 565-67 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982).
224. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. at 128-30, reevd, 664 F.2d at 565-67.
225. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. at 129-30, citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403
U.S. 431, 441-42 (1971). These differences have produced the need for the nominating petition

route of ballot access.
226.

See supra note 225. "Sometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating

things that are different as though they were exactly alike, a truism well illustrated in Williams v. Rhodes." Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
227.
228.

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. at 130.
Id.
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personal appeal as individuals, there is sufficient similarity in the two
types of candidacies to warrant equal protection analysis.22 9 Upon
application of the strict scrutiny standard, the district court struck
down the filing deadline.230
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit, in upholding the filing statute,
emphasized the differences between the two types of candidacies by
stressing that the independent candidate "has no interest or right
comparable to that of [a] political party." 31 Specifically, the court
found that the statutory right allowing a partisan candidate to run in
the general election without complying with the earlier filing deadline required of an independent candidate, is a "right of political
2 32
parties, with rather an incidental effect on partisan candidates.
Thus, despite the fact that the two kinds of candidates may have the
"same interest . . . in being able to make a late decision," the court
ruled that they warrant different treatment due to the incomparable
rights which a political party possesses and an independent candidate
23 3
lacks.
The circuit court's analysis purports to focus on rights 234 in
reaching its conclusion that the two types of candidates are not alike
and, therefore, do not require equal treatment. The lower court's inquiry centers on the similarity of the candidate's qualities in its conclusion that the candidates are sufficiently alike to require equal
treatment. However, both courts' analyses are subject to the same
criticism: they do not transcend an issue of semantics. As Peter Weston has aptly indicated, "equality analysis logically collapses into
rights analysis" 2 5 because the idea that likes should be treated alike
"presupposes anterior constitutional standards for ascertaining 'likeness' and 'unalikeness.' "236 In other words, since no two individuals
are alike in all respects and yet everyone is alike in some respect, the
conclusion that likes should be treated alike is purely tautological. 37
The process of ascertaining the constitutional standards upon which
to determine the relevant similarities or differences of these types of
229. Id.
230. Id. at 139.
231. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d at 567.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Specifically, the right of the political parties to make a late decision as to who will
be its candidate. Id.
235. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 560 (1982).
236. Id. (emphasis in original).
237. Id. at 544, 547.
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candidates necessarily involves an examination of the underlying
constitutional rights implicated in the controversy, not an ad hoc discussion of abstract differences and similarities merely to support an
a priori conclusion.
Thus, applying Weston's analysis, to say that the equal protection clause provides that if independent candidates are "like" partisan candidates for constitutional purposes, then the state must treat
them alike, is in one sense completely superfluous238 -since to reach
this decision the court must have already ascertained and applied its
constitutional standard for determining when candidates are to be
treated alike. In so doing, the court has thereby reached its ultimate
conclusion as to the substantive rights at issue.
Thus, the real flaw in both the circuit court and the district
court analyses occurs before they even reach the inquiry as to
whether or not the independent candidates are sufficiently "like"
partisan candidates (and/or political parties) to be treated equally.
Their errors lie in the constitutional standard of analysis they applied to ascertain when candidates should be treated alike. In particular, the circuit court did not fully consider the importance of the
first amendment rights affected by the statute, since its constitutional standard was essentially whether the laws were "designed rationally to further sufficiently important state goals"; 239 the district
court erred by requiring the state to satisfy a compelling state interest test which did not thoroughly consider the rights of the state. 40
The courts should have applied a constitutional standard which
would have adequately weighed the opposing interests and rights of
the candidate and his supporters against that of the state.24 If the
courts would have completed this substantive examination of rights
any further discussion of the similarities and differences of these
types of candidates in an abstract comparison, isolated from the preceding constitutional analysis, would have been fruitless.
D. Balancing Analysis
This inquiry has explicated the state interests that are potentially furthered by filing deadlines statutes and has shown how the
238. Cf. Westen, id. at 560-63 (discussing whether labor picketers are like political picketers for constitutional purposes). For an illustration of the futility of equality analysis through
the case of Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), see Westen, supra note 235, at 560-63.
239. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d at 567.
240. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. at 127.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 83, 140-43.
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interests of individual candidates and voters are arguably burdened
by such a statute. It is now appropriate to weigh these competing
concerns and draw the proper conclusions. In so doing, one must not
only consider the importance of these interests qua interests, but also
examine both the level of the statute's efficiency in fulfilling its underlying interests and the weight of the burden imposed by the statute on various individuals.
The Sixth Circuit, in Arlderson v. Celebrezze, 242 found that the
burden on a presidential candidate to decide whether to run by
March 20 was not very large considering the power and influence of
the office and the fact that most serious candidates have already decided to run by such a date.243 Regardless of the accuracy of such an
analysis, the Sixth Circuit prematurely concluded its inquiry concerning the extent of the statute's burdensome effects. Filing deadline statutes, such as those challenged in the Anderson cases, burden
not only the candidate's freedom as to when he must initiate his candidacy but, perhaps more importantly, burden his supporters' rights
to associate and effectively cast their votes for the candidate of their
choice. Thus, the burdensome effects of these statutes can not simply
be viewed as the denial of ballot access to the serious candidates who
decide to run as independents after the filing deadline. Rather, as in
Anderson v. Celebrezze, if the state interest furthered is voter
awareness, 24 4 then the superior knowledge gleaned by voters about
independents in the extra time provided by the early deadline must
be balanced against the seriousness of the harm inflicted on the supporters of the excluded candidate if they can neither vote for, nor
effectively associate with, the candidate of their choice.
As important as an informed electorate may be, an early filing
242. 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2035 (1982).
243. 664 F.2d at 554.
244. See 664 F.2d at 565. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the filing deadline statute

was not burdensome because it "would for the most part screen out [only] candidates in
Anderson's position-those who decided to run, but did not decide early enough what form

their candidacy should take. The Constitution does not require Ohio to alleviate the difficulty
of choosing among alternate routes to the ballot." Id. Yet, if the statute was intended to provide the voters with more information about independent candidates, this state interest of voter
awareness is not promoted by excluding those candidates whom the voters are already familiar
with-namely candidates who have already decided to run, but have changed their route of
ballot access. Rather, the real rationale underlying the court's conclusion is that the statute
furthers political stability by excluding those previously affiliated candidates from running as

independents. Since political stability as the state interest justifying the filing deadline is a
somewhat dubious argument, see supra notes 184-205 and accompanying text, this may help

explain the court's reluctance to find explicitly that such an interest is sufficient to uphold the
statute.
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deadline is not a very effective way to increase voters' knowledge
about the candidates. 4 5 When one weighs the possibility that some
voters may be better informed about the independent candidates
with the fact that other voters will have their associational and voting rights impaired when their candidate is denied ballot access due
to the early filing deadline, one is lead to the conclusion that the
constitutional infringement outweighs any increased voter awareness.
This conclusion implies that the filing deadline for independent and
third parties should be close to the general election, and preferably
follow the party's primaries.
If the burden on exluded candidates and their potential voters is
balanced with the state interest of preventing voter confusion by denying ballot access to frivolous candidates, the scale tips even further
in favor of the individuals' interests. This is so because the weight of
the burden on important individual interests remains the same while
the effectiveness of the statute in advancing an important state interest diminishes. An early filing deadline would screen out some frivolous candidates who decide to run for election after the deadline, but
it would also exclude all serious candidates who initiated their candidacies following the deadlines.246 Such a statute would not only be
over-inclusive in its effect, but would be inefficient and duplicative in
accomplishing its goal. Since quantitative signature requirements necessitate that candidates satisfy a reasonable level of community
support, all frivolous candidates would be eliminated by such restrictions, regardless of the filing date. The only way to construct an argument in support of this state interest that could avoid the problem
of the statute's inefficiency, would be to define all candidates who did
not comply with the filing deadline as, ipso facto, not serious candidates. However, this is not only inconsistent with the accepted meaning of this word in the election law context, 47 but would then create
245. This is mainly true because whatever knowledge most voters possess about the candidates is derived from the media. As the Bradley court correctly observed, media coverage
does not begin until the primary campaign becomes "heated," which is for the large part after
the filing deadlines challenged in the Anderson cases occur. See Bradley v. Mandel, 449 F.
Supp. 983, 986 (D. Md. 1978). Although this may be less true in presidential elections where
some media coverage may begin with the first state primary, the focus of the media at such an
early date is largely upon the primary candidates. See supra note 207. Furthermore, voter
knowledge could be more effectively increased in a variety of other ways.
It is important to note that the foregoing is not a least drastic means inquiry (i.e., could
the state achieve its goal by moving the filing date closer to the election?) but an inquiry into
how effective the statute is in achieving the goal that supposedly justifies it.
246. See supra notes 180-83, 192-95 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 158-83 and accompanying text.
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the absurdity of labeling such presidential candidates as John Anderson, and George Wallace (both of whom received substantial popular support in the general election) 248 as frivolous candidates. 249
IV.

CONCLUSION

If there is one principle which has been the cornerstone of our
democracy, it is the freedom to select those who will govern us. In
fact, one might say that this right is the foundation for all our other
constitutional rights. 250 Intrinsic to this notion of self-government is
the belief that if people choose among competing candidates, each
possessing different political and philosophical perspectives, then the
candidate whose views on important issues most closely approximates our societal norms will be elected. 5
Insofar as the Democrats and Republicans do not have a monopoly on political truth, independent and third party candidates fulfill the important function of providing legitimate outlets for alternative ideologies.2 52 The value of such a function can not be
underestimated because, as Chief Justice Warren" noted, the ideas
espoused by the dissident groups of today often become the views
accepted by the majority of tomorrow.253 Th s, regardless of the actual electoral success of independent and third party candidates,
their mere presence in the campaign and on the ballot helps to insure
that our leaders will be more responsive to, and representative of, the
nation at large. Such candidates effectively are prevented from performing this vital role in our political system if they are denied access to the ballot due to non-compliance with such statutory restrictions as filing deadlines. 2 " When this occurs, the courts should
explicitly balance the constitutional interests of the candidates and
supporters against the state interest underlying the statute to determine the statute's validity. 255 In so doing, the courts not only should
248.

See N.Y. Times, May 4, 1982, at B7, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1968, at 9, col. 1.

249. The purported state interests in promoting administrative efficiency and political
stability have been discussed elsewhere in this note. The argument that administrative effi-

ciency in ballot preparation supports a filing deadline as early as March or April is so weak
that parties do not address it or courts summarily dismiss it. See supra notes 144-49 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the state interest in political stability balanced against
the interests of the individuals, see supra notes 183-205, 208-21 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 1, 44 and accompanying text.

251.

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

252.

See supra notes 208-19 and accompanying text.

253. See supra text accompanying note 210.
254.

See supra notes 208-19 and accompanying text.

255. See supra notes 83, 140-43 and accompanying text.
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examine the competing interests equitably but should demonstrate
the rationale of their decision without resorting to outcome determinative terminology.
In applying a balancing analysis to the filing deadlines challenged in the Anderson cases, one concludes that the importance of
the candidates' and supporters' first amendment rights outweighs the
state interests supporting the statute, to the extent that the filing
date occurs prior to the time required to satisfy the state's administrative needs and before the major party primaries. This conclusion
is based primarily upon two critical observations: (1) a significantly
earlier filing deadline would be inefficient or inappropriate to serve
administrative purposes, to prevent voter confusion, to promote voter
awareness, or to maintain political stability; 256 (2) insofar as the independent and third party candidacies are initiated in response to
the voters' dissatisfaction with the major party candidates and their
positions on the issues, filing deadlines that occur prior to the major
party primaries, require dissident groups and potential candidates to
foresee the unknown and seek separate ballot access before allowing
the major parties an opportunity to accommodate their minority
views. 257 Therefore, early filing deadlines that unjustifiably restrict
the ballot access of serious independent and third party candidates,
not only chill the important first amendment rights of the excluded
candidate and his supporters but, more importantly, threaten the
sanctity of our nation's most fundamental principle-the right of
self-government. 58
Fred H. Perkins

256. See supra notes 144-221, 242-49 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 206-21 and accompanying text.
258. As this note went to press, the United States Supreme Court decided Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 51 U.S.L.W. 4375 (Apr. 19, 1983) (No. 81-1635), reversing the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that Ohio's
filing deadline statute imposed an unconstitutional burden on the voting and associational
rights of Anderson's supporters. Although the Court utilized the balancing test derived from
its previous ballot access cases, it choose to analyze this case directly on first amendment
grounds without resting its decision on the equal protection clause. Perhaps, the Court's unstated rationale underlying this change in its analytical methodology may be rooted in the
conceptual need, posited by this note, to liberate its implicit balancing test from the linguistic
confines of equal protection's two-tier structure. Furthermore, the Court's willingness to discard its customary equality analysis lends further support to this note's argument that such
discussion is often merely superfluous, particularly in the ballot access context.
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